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ABSTRACT 
 
Managing risk is one of the main activities of venture capital companies. Despite the fact that this topic 
is of high practical relevance, only little research was published on risk management performed by 
venture capital companies in their ventures. Hence, we conducted a structured literature review which 
was the basis for developing five hypotheses concerning measures to decrease failure risk in venture 
capital-backed ventures. We tested these hypotheses with an empirical data set of 93 venture capital-
backed ventures in Germany using original deal data from nine different venture capital funds using a 
structural equation model. We showed that the experience and the skills of the corresponding investment 
manager have a significant negative impact on the failure risk of a venture. Investment manager´s 
experience and skills were measured by the working and founding experience, the technology expertise 
and the network size. Hence, the results emphasize the importance of the selection of the investment 
manager for risk management in venture capital investments.  
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I. Introduction 
Risk management can add value and is necessary in all types of companies to 
secure long-term stability (Frooth et al., 1993; Mackay and Moeller, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the topic of risk management is still in its infancy as articles are mainly 
published in finance and accounting, but less in management or entrepreneurship 
journals (Bromiley et al., 2015). Especially venture capital (VC) investments are well 
known as high risk investments since venture capital companies (VCCs) invest in 
ventures with a high growth but also high risk potential (LiPuma and Park, 2014). 
Young entrepreneurial firms face the challenge of “liability of newness” resulting in 
particular difficulties, e.g. shorter expected life, and a greater risk of failure (Ang, 1992; 
Coleman, 2004). 
 In the investment decision making process, VCC are often faced with 
uncertainty about the future performance of the venture and the adverse selection 
problem. The reason for that is that VCC have to rely on information about the 
venture supplied by the entrepreneur (Tourani-Rad and England, 2003). A 
comparative study by Zacharakis and Meyer (2000) showed that VC investments fail at 
a rate of 35 to 55 per cent. Young and entrepreneurial firms are an essential part of the 
German economy and an important source for innovation in order to stay competitive 
on a global basis. Hence, research on comprehensive risk management for the VC 
industry is of great practical importance to improve the practices how German VCCs 
pursue risk management which might reduce the risk of failure of their ventures. 
Risk management pursued in VC-backed ventures is only moderately 
researched in academic literature (Yoshikawa et al., 2004; Tan et al., 2008). Previous 
studies either focus on single types of risk, e.g. macro-risk (Ning et al., 2015) or 
liquidity risk (Cumming et al., 2005) or on specific types of risk management 
measures, e.g. syndication (Wang et al., 2012), (Hopp, 2010) or financial contracting 
and incentive mechanisms (Tan et al., 2008). Studies analyzing comprehensive sets of 
risk management measures applied by VCCs ventures are limited (see e.g. Kut et al., 
2006; Kut et al., 2007; Kut and Smolarski, 2006 and Smolarski et al., 2005). These 
studies used comparable methods and similar samples leading to a lack of new findings 
(Dimov and Murray, 2008; Milavo and Fernhaber, 2009). However, risk management 
is one of the core competencies of VCC and therefore a highly relevant topic in 
practice. One reason for the limited amount of studies in this field might be the lack of 
reliable data. VC-backed ventures are private companies and only limited subject to the 
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duty of publishing company data and financial statements (Bygrave, 2006; Neergaard 
and Ulhoi, 2006). 
To analyze risk management measures and their impact on the failure risk of 
VC-backed ventures we pursued the following research strategy: We conducted a 
structured literature review to develop five hypotheses on risk management measures 
applied by VCC in ventures, i.e. the assessment and evaluation of new ventures, 
contracts, investment manager´s experience and skills, governance mechanisms and 
management support. These hypotheses were tested with a structural equation model 
using an empirical data set of 93 VC-backed ventures in Germany from nine different 
VC funds. 
As risk management received relatively little attention in entrepreneurship 
literature (Pinkwart, 2002) and is an important research topic, but largely unsystematic 
and not easy to diversify (Manigart et al., 2002), we add to literature and practice as 
follows: 
1. We used a rare data set with in-depth quantitative and qualitative data from 
nine public and private VC funds combining data obtained from a survey with 
investment managers and original deal documents like business plans, investment 
committee papers, reporting and annual statements. 
2. We provide an analysis of the Germany VC market which was rather 
moderately studied in literature before. Thereby, we shed light into the risk 
management practices of German VC funds. 
3. The results from our structural equation model imply that particularly 
investment manager´s experience and skills have a statistically significant impact to 
reduce failure risk in VC-backed ventures. This finding supports Hopp and Lukas 
(2014) who were among the first showing that investment managers can have 
technological, industry, financial and managerial experience and leadership skills which 
might be crucial for the success and failure ventures. Furthermore, governance 
mechanisms, e.g. milestones and reporting, were heavily applied by all VCC. However, 
contrary to other studies like Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) and Tan et al. (2008) we 
cannot show that governance mechanisms have a significant effect on reducing the risk 
of venture´s failure.  
 
II. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
Risk can be defined as the probability and severity of adverse effects (Aven, 
2011). Therefore, risk management is crucial to manage the uncertainty of risks. A 
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sound risk management is characterized as proactive, aligned and economic including 
the identification, estimation, evaluation, treatment and monitoring of possible 
negative influences on performance (Hain, 2011). VCC are financial intermediaries 
investing foremost in ventures bridging the gap created by the shortage of appropriate 
financing for small and entrepreneurial firms (LiPuma and Park, 2014; Okpala, 2012). 
By investing in ventures VCC bear high risk due to information asymmetries between 
the investor and entrepreneur known as the principal agent problem (LiPuma and 
Park, 2014). Hence, VCC apply different types of risk management measures to reduce 
the risk of the investment. Risk management in VC-backed ventures was sparsely 
analyzed in academic literature (Yoshikawa et al., 2004; Tan et al., 2008). The studies 
of Kut et al. (2006), Kut et al. (2007), Smolarski et al. (2005) investigated how buy-
out and VC funds in Europe overall, in India, UK, France and Germany manage risk 
in the pre-screening phase of the investment, in existing ventures, the portfolio risk and 
macro risk considering a comprehensive set of risk management measures. These 
studies showed first attempts to analyze a set of risk management measures. 
Nevertheless, the studies are subject to several limitations especially due to partially 
small samples.  
We conducted a structured literature review to study the current state of 
academic literature on the topic of risk management in VC-backed ventures. First, we 
analyzed all entrepreneurship journals ranked in the 55th edition of the Journal 
Quality List edited by Prof. Anne-Wil Harzing from 2005 to 2015 regarding the 
keywords “risk”, “risk management”, “venture capital” and “failure”. We identified 
thirteen relevant studies. Second, we searched in the EBSCOhost Online Research 
Databases for the abovementioned keywords in the titles and abstracts of all types of 
academic journals from 2005 to 2015. Overall, we identified 17 relevant papers (see 
Appendix A, Table 4). The samples of the different studies vary greatly in size and data 
collection method. A considerable number of studies are of explorative nature due to 
partly small sample sizes. This implies that this field of research is relatively unexplored 
offering room for further research. The majority of papers used data from the US and 
in some cases parts of Europe or Asia. Only few studies were conducted in Germany.   
A. Risk types in VC-backed ventures 
VC investments are subject to several risks. Our structured literature review 
showed that academic scholars investigated agency risk, financial or liquidity risk, 
technology risk, market risk, human resources risk, internationalization risk and macro 
risk. In the following, the different types of risks are described. 
Agency risk is often stated as the major risk for VCC due potential problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard between entrepreneurs and VCC (Bengtsson and 
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Sensoy, 2011; Lu et al., 2006; Tan et al., 2008). The theory was developed by William 
Meckling, Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen depicting the conflict of interest between 
the principal and the agent, in the case of VC founders or managers of the venture and 
the VCC (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Mechanisms like 
financial contracting, milestones, gradual provision of capital and active involvement in 
the board are applied by venture capitalists to overcome the information asymmetry 
between the VCCs and the entrepreneur (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011; Lu et al., 2006; 
Tan et al., 2008). 
Liquidity or financial risks are partially used as synonyms in academic literature. 
Kut et al. (2006), Kut et al. (2007), Smolarski et al. (2005) classified financial risk in 
their analysis on the level of the portfolio and macro economy. Contrary, liquidity risk 
was analyzed by Cumming et al. (2005) indicating that VCC adjust their investment 
decisions according to liquidity risk. Liquidity risk refers according to Cumming et al. 
(2005) to the exit risk for the VCC in IPO markets describing the risk of not being 
able to reach an exit in a proper way. The study showed that VCC prefer to invest in 
high-tech and early stage ventures to defer the exit and increases the syndication size 
(Cumming et al., 2005). In our analysis, we define liquidity or financial risk as the risk 
of the venture to become illiquid or even bankrupt. 
Technology risk is often used synonymously as product risk, technological risk or 
technical risk in academic literature. Assessing the technology or product risk is crucial 
risk for VCC before investing in ventures due to the fact that technologies and 
products are often not market-ready. Technology due diligences, syndication and the 
opinions of investment managers with industry experience are used to overcome the 
risk associated with technologies and products (Kut et al., 2006; Kut et al., 2007; 
Smolarski et. al., 2005; Wang et al., 2012). 
Market risk is mainly related to the commercialization of a new technology 
(Wang et al., 2012). Ventures often lack the marketing capabilities necessary to take 
the technology to market (Wang et al., 2012). VCC apply due diligences to assess the 
market risk as a central part of the investment decision process (Lu et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, VCC utilize their network and skills to foster the market introduction. 
According to Kaplan and Strömberg (2002) major market risks are market size and 
growth, competition and barriers to entry and the likelihood of customer adoption. 
However, the results indicated that competition, market size and customer adoption 
risks mentioned at a moderate rate of 40, 31 and 22 per cent in the investment 
documents (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002). 
Human resources risks are risks associated with the quality and capabilities of the 
management of the venture. This was analyzed by the studies of Kut et al. (2006), Kut 
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et al. (2007) and Smolarski et al. (2005). In these studies human resources risk was 
measured by the lack of management performance and the lack of management focus. 
To mitigate the risk related to the management, VCC can verify the track record of the 
management team and can invest in management teams which are previously known 
(Kut et al., 2007). Kaplan and Strömberg (2002) showed that risks associated with the 
management were mentioned in 61% of the analyses. It was documented that the CEO 
is a “difficult” person, that the management lacks in financial planning, the 
management is not able to focus or that the management is young and inexperienced 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002). In addition, a further risky issue for VCC is an 
incomplete management team (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002). Overall, the results 
indicate that risks associated with human capital are of high relevance for VCC. 
LiPuma and Park studied the special topic of internationalization risk using 
longitudinal data of 962 invested rounds in 334 VC-backed ventures (LiPuma and 
Park, 2014). Variables for risk management were round size, round interval and round 
syndication. Compared to solely domestic ventures, VCC use smaller syndicates and 
provide smaller and less frequent rounds of capital for ventures which internationalize 
opportunistically (LiPuma and Park, 2014). 
Volatility and macroeconomic drivers, namely macro risk, affect VC 
investments by the total amount, by the number of deals, and by the average amount 
per deal (Ning et al., 2015). Types of macro risk can be inflation risk, business-cycle 
risk, interest rate risk and foreign exchange rate risk (Kut et al., 2006). Therefore, in 
times of high macro risk VCC adapt their risk preferences and investment strategies by 
investing in fewer deals with a smaller average amount per deal, raising their 
investments in later investment stages and injecting a lower percent of cash in the first 
several financing sequences (Ning et al., 2015). 
Failure risk as one of the most severe risks for VCC was not contained in the 
results of our structured literature review. In a further search we explored that only very 
few researchers studied this topic empirically (Dimov and De Clercq, 2006). Therefore, 
we focused in our analysis on this type of risk since failure risk consists partially of the 
above mentioned risk types according to insolvency literature (Carter and van Auken, 
2006), (Davila et al., 2003), (Headd, 2003), (Pinkwart et al., 2015), (Pleschak, 2002), 
(Schilling, 2002), namely liquidity risk, market risk, human resources risk and 
technology risk. Therefore we include these risk factors as variables in our model to 
describe failure risk. 
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B. Risk management in VC-backed firms 
The literature review has shown that VCC apply the following risk 
management measures: 1) assessment and evaluation of new ventures (Kut et al., 2007; 
Lu et al., 2006), 2) governance (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011; Tan et al., 2008) and 3) 
contracting (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011; Kut et al., 2007; Tan et al., 2008). In the 
course of the interviews with practitioners we identified two further influencing factor 
to reduce risk in VC investments, investment manager´s experience and skills as well as 
management support. There might be some interactions between the different risk 
management measures, e.g. governance mechanisms and management support. In the 
context of support functions of VCC governance mechanisms are a part of the support 
functions. However, in this context we separated governance mechanisms from 
management support due to the fact that governance mechanisms belong to the most 
important risk management measures in VC deals. 
Assessing and evaluating potential new investments are the first steps of risk 
management VCC can apply in the investment process. Kut et al. (2007) showed that 
risk management in evaluating new investments is a well-developed area in practice in 
the VC industry (Kut et al., 2007). VCC have a variety of tools to assess and evaluate 
potential investment targets regarding risk and return, e.g. performing different types of 
due diligences like financial, product, market, customer, legal, competitor analysis 
internally and externally and analyzing audited financial statements (Kut et al., 2007; 
Kut and Smolarski, 2006; Lu et al., 2006; Smolarski et al., 2005). Information 
asymmetries can for example be resolved through the overall coherence of the business 
plan and the VCC’s own due diligence report according to Tourani-Rad and England 
(2003). VCC can also check the risk associated with the management by verifying the 
track record of the management team and board members and performing criminal 
background checks (Kut et al., 2007; Kut and Smolarski, 2006; Smolarski et al., 2005). 
Further measures to be conducted before an investment decision is made can be the 
consideration of synergies with existing ventures and the risk preferences of the 
investors of the fund (Kut et al., 2007; Kut and Smolarski, 2006; Smolarski et al., 
2005). We assume that a better assessment of the risk before investing might lead to a 
lower failure rate of VC-backed venture. 
Hypotheses 1: A high effort in assessing and evaluating the investment is 
negatively related to failure risk of VC-backed ventures.   
Financial contracting can be used by VCC as a protection against downside risk 
(Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011; Kut et al., 2007; Tan et al., 2008), but also to generate 
value in portfolio companies by mitigating the agency problem with financial contracts 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002). Financial contracting is one measure next to active 
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involvement (Kut et al., 2007) and direct monitoring to reduce information 
asymmetry, motivational and financials problems (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011). VCC 
apply financial contracting mechanisms like liquidation preference, anti-dilution rights, 
cumulative dividends, redemption rights, participation rights and pay-to-play 
provisions according to Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) and Tan et al. (2008). 
Syndication is a common measure in the VC industry to team up for assessing and 
investing collaboratively ventures to share the risk (Hopp, 2010; Hopp and Lukas, 
2014; Smolarski et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2012). Staged financing is a useful control 
mechanism for VCC to gather information and monitor the progress of the venture 
having the option to inject further capital when milestones are reached and periodically 
abandon the venture (Kut and Smolarski, 2006; Tan et al., 2008). Adding to this, 
Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) identified that good governance abilities can be a 
substitute for measures of financial contracting. Therefore, we state that a high use of 
contracting mechanisms might lower the risk of failure of VC-backed firms: 
Hypothesis 2: An extensive use of contracting mechanisms is negatively related 
to the failure risk of VC-backed ventures.   
VCC are known as active investors in their ventures. Risk management 
mechanisms related to governance like milestones, reporting and an active involvement 
in the board are applied by VCC to reduce agency risk. This risk type describes the 
interest conflict in the relationship between the investor and the entrepreneur. A 
considerable amount of studies investigated how VCC use control and incentive 
mechanisms to enhance the firm’s performance and receive higher returns. Contrary, 
only a few studies focused on this topic to reduce downside or failure risk (Bengtsson 
and Sensoy, 2011; Tan et al., 2008). According to Tan et al. (2008) governance risk 
management measures can be distinguished in either control mechanisms like 
monitoring (e.g. reporting, frequency of interaction, convertible securities), staged 
investments, which we allocated to financial contracting, and the allocation of 
ownership and control rights or incentive mechanisms (Tan et al., 2008). Shares of 
stock rights of the entrepreneur and employee stock options are incentive mechanisms 
to reduce agency risk. The greater VCC´s monitoring abilities, the more effective is the 
monitoring at constraining the entrepreneur´s behavior (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011). 
From practice, we know that all VCC use control mechanism, hence we assume: 
Hypothesis 3: The extensive use of governance mechanisms are negatively 
related to the failure risk of VC-backed ventures.   
Investment managers are responsible for assessing new ventures and investment 
decisions in the pre-investment phase as well as the management of existing ventures in 
the post-investment phase, i.e. communication, meetings, controlling and supporting 
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the venture. Investment managers can have technological, industry, financial and 
managerial experience and leadership skills which might be crucial for the success and 
failure ventures (Hopp and Lukas, 2014). According to Hopp and Lukas (2014) more 
experienced investment managers control their investments less often than less 
experiences investors. Furthermore, more industry experience allows less frequent and 
intense evaluation (Hopp and Lukas, 2014). Yazdipour and Constand (2010) argued 
that researchers cannot ignore the human/managerial/decision-making side in failure 
prediction. Hence, they suggest in human decisions about the making or breaking of a 
private company a shifts from the commerce/operational (effect) side of failure analysis 
to the human/managerial/decision making (cause) side of it (Yazdipour and Constand, 
2010). We assume that an experienced investment manager can be better in assessing 
risk and using countermeasures which can lead to a lower failure risk of VC-backed 
firms: 
Hypothesis 4: The degree of investment manager´s experience is negatively 
related to the failure risk of VC-backed ventures. 
A variety of studies proved that VCC add value to their portfolio companies 
(Alperovych and Hübner, 2013; Manigart et al., 2002; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 
1996) by applying different types of value added services like financials, governance, 
strategy, operational improvements and human capital improvements (Bottazzi et al., 
2002; Cumming et al., 2005; Guo and Jiang, 2013; Tang et al., 2014; Timmons and 
Bygrave, 1986). We transferred the positive effects from management support to the 
literature of risk management in the VC industry. Hence, we assume that management 
support can have an impact on the failure risk of VCC´s portfolio companies: 
Hypothesis 5: The extensive use of management support provided by VCC is 
negatively related to the failure risk of VCC´s portfolio companies.   
 
 
III. Data and method 
A. Sample 
Our sample consists of 93 VC-backed firms collected from nine different 
public and private public partnership VC funds in Germany. Considering the statistics 
of the Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften, which recorded 433 
seed investments in Germany from 2005 to 2010, our sample covers 21.5% of the seed 
investments in this time frame in Germany. We conducted a survey with the 
corresponding investment managers. In addition, we had access to the original deal 
documents including the business plans, investment committee papers, reporting and 
10                                              Proksch, Stranz, Pinkwart & Schefczyk • Risk Management 
 
annual statements of the investments. That enabled us to collect in-depth quantitative 
and qualitative data. 
Considering our data set, the VC-backed firms are on average 4.6 years old at 
the time of data collection. In the seed round the firms received on average 784,487 
Euros as investment and in the series A round 1,202,948 Euros (see table 1). The firms 
in our data set are technology-based firms as they operate in the industries information 
technology and automation (39 %), life science (34%), material science (9 %), energy 
(5 %), communication (4 %) and others (9 %). 
 
 
 
Table 1. Overview of our data set 
Variable  Mean Median Std. Dev 
Age of ventures  4.59 years 5 2.09 
Size of founders team  2.85 founders 3 1.13 
Number of founding 
rounds  
1.98 rounds 2 0.89 
Investment sum Seed  784,487 Euro 644,109 Euros 519,577 
Investment sum Series A  1,202,948 Euros 816,287 Euros 1,179,085 
Number of investors Seed  2.55 2 1.98 
Number of investors 
Series A  
3.94 3 2.54 
 
B. Measures and variables  
We used a structural equation model approach to build and test our model 
because failure risk can hardly be measured directly. Hence, we used a set of proxy 
variables. We built a partial least squares (PLS) model because of its suitability for 
proxy variables and the lack of existing scales in this field of research (Ainudding et al., 
2007; Henseler et al., 2009). Furthermore, the fit of PLS models compared to 
covariance based methods for sample sizes smaller than 100 also attributed to our 
choice (Fornell and Bookstein, 1982). Not all of our items follow normal distribution. 
Hence, they would have been omitted once using a covariance based approach. In PLS 
models items do not have to follow a certain distribution (Hulland, 1999). In addition, 
we use variables measured with a 5-point Likert scale in our model. PLS models 
support the use of nominal, ordinal and interval scaled data (Fornell and Bookstein, 
1982, Nitzl, 2010; see also Menzar and Nigh, 1995, Brinckmann et al., 2011). We 
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decided to use a reflective measurement model for the outer constructs of the risk 
management measures, the control variables and the construct of business failure as 
well as for the inner construct for two reasons. Reflective measurement models have 
defined reliability test criteria and are well researched (Roy and Tarafdar, 2012). 
Further, our indicator variables strongly correlate within our construct. 
1. Dependent variables 
Measuring failure risk of a company is difficult. Therefore, we measure failure 
risk by proxy variables, namely human resource risk, technology risk, financial risk and 
market risk based on the literature of bankruptcy and insolvency (Pinkwart et al., 
2015). Pinkwart et al. (2005) showed that 80 per cent of the reasons for failure include 
a lack of management companies or management companies. Other studies confirmed 
human resources as an important reason for business failure (Carter and van Auken, 
2006; Headd, 2003). A further cause of failure is risk related to the technology of a 
venture (Schilling, 2002). These companies are dependent on developing their 
technology to a working and marked-proved product. If ventures do not succeed in 
reaching the market readiness in a timely manner development costs can grow in 
outstanding way which ventures often cannot afford (Pleschak et al., 2002). Difficulties 
in getting a follow-up financing, miscalculation for the capital need and bad planning 
are among the most common reasons for business failure, namely financial risk (Davila 
et al., 2003; Headd, 2003; Pleschak et al., 2002; Thornhill and Amit, 2003). New 
ventures often need too long to break even or even fail because of the lack of financial 
resources. A further reason for the failure of companies can be found in the area of the 
market. Problems with the market entry or in marketing and sales are among the most 
common reasons of failure (Wagner, 1994; Dowling and Drumm, 2002; Pleschak, 
2002). This can be explained by a lack of experience in marketing and sales as well as 
an overoptimistic planning (Hall, 1992; Thornhill and Amit, 2003). In addition, new 
companies often rely on a few key clients leading to a strong dependency from these 
customers (Brüderl et al., 1996; Guggemoos, 2012). We measured the five above 
mentioned risk types by the assessment of the supervising investment managers on a 
scale from 1 to 5 (1: very low risk, 5: very high risk). 
2. Independent variables 
As mentioned in chapter II. B. we identified five groups of risk management 
measures applied by VCC, i.e. assessment and evaluation of new ventures, contracting, 
governance, investment managers’ experience and skills and management support. 
Each group was measured by different items since VCC use several risk management 
measures for each group comprehensively in practice. 
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We used different items to measure the degree of assessment. We first looked if 
an external assessment of the company was done. From the VCC documents we knew 
that often external companies are hired to evaluate e.g. technology, market and legal 
risks. Further, we looked at the intellectual property protection. If the technology is 
protected by e.g. patents or registered designs the market and technology risks might be 
lower. In addition, we measured if the VCC relied on their network in assessing the 
technology and the competencies of the founders. 
Contracts handle different aspects of risks between the entrepreneur and the 
VCC. An important item is liquidation preference. A high liquidation preference 
lowers the risk of VCC as it minimizes possible losses. We analyzed how strongly a 
liquidation preference was used. Further, we measured the number of syndication 
partners. Syndication is a possibility to share risk with other investors. Further, we 
looked at the investment sum. If the investment sum is lower it might increase the risk 
of failure in terms of liquidity. In addition we intended to measure if staged financing 
was used. However, due to the fact that this was the case for all our cases we did not 
include this item in our model. 
Governance mechanisms like reporting and milestones are useful to assess risks 
continuously. To measure governance we included five proxy variables in our model. 
At first we looked if milestones were used and monitored. VCC often use milestones to 
bind founders to certain goals. If milestones are reached, founders receive the full 
investment sum. In addition, we looked at reporting. From expert interviews we knew 
that successful companies report regularly. If the company does not perform as 
expected, reporting rates might decrease. We therefore measured how heavily VCC rely 
on reporting. Furthermore, we included personal exchange in our model as it indicates 
a high interaction between founders and investment managers. Fourthly, we included 
the variable information through network in our model. According to principal agent 
theory a conflict exists between founders and VCC due to information asymmetry. 
Therefore, if VCC use their network to lower information asymmetries risks might be 
reduced. Lastly, we investigated at the shares of the founders. If the founders still have a 
high share of equity they might be more motivated financially and incentivized even if 
they lost decision rights due to the contract with the VCC. 
Investment manager´s experience and skills might have a significant influence 
on the failure risk of ventures. We described the experience and skills of the investment 
manager by five variables. First, we looked at the working experience. More working 
experience might make it easier to deal in business environment. Second, we assessed 
the founding experience. Third, we analyzed the expertise with the field of technology. 
Forth, we assessed the business skills of the investment manager. An investment 
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manager has to have a profound understanding of business to be able to evaluate the 
development of the ventures. Lastly, we analyzed the network size. With a superior 
network, the investment manager has more possibilities to get additional knowledge 
and support for areas he is not an expert on. 
We measured the degree of management support by six variables. Firstly, we 
looked at the support by the VCC using own competencies. Bringing in their 
experience in the company might lead to better development of the portfolio company. 
Further, we looked at sales support. Young companies often fail because of a lack of 
sales activities. A support in the area could possibly lead to a lower risk of failure. 
Thirdly, we analyzed support with technology. For new ventures technology is a crucial 
success factor. Fourthly, we examined strategic support. A strong strategy is often an 
indicator for successful firms. In addition, we looked at support in follow-up financing. 
For new ventures it is critical to raise additional financing in a timely manner to avoid 
illiquidity and bankruptcy. Lastly, we measured the use of network in general to lower 
the risk of the venture after the investment took place. Networks might be useful to get 
new customers or consultants for solving issues. 
3. Control variables 
We controlled for age and industry. The risk of failure might be higher when 
companies are younger. Albach (1987) suggested that for most companies the highly 
probable chance of failure ends after five years. In addition, some industries might have 
higher failure rate than others. 
 
IV. Results 
A. Descriptive statistics 
The results of the descriptive statistics are presented in appendix B (see Table 
5). The failure risk was measures on a 5-point Likert scale (1: very low, 5 very high). 
The statistics show that liquidity risk has the highest value of 3.652 at the lowest 
standard deviation of 1.152. Technology risk was rated on average at 2.711 depicting 
the lowest failure of risk measures, but at the highest standard deviation of 1.455.   
The descriptive statistics for the five groups of risk management present that 
governance mechanisms like milestones (mean = 4.247) or reporting (mean= 4.355) at 
a standard deviation of below 0.8 were deployed consistently high by the VCC in our 
sample. The same applies for risk management like obtaining references of founders 
(mean=4.086), liquidation preference (mean= 4.096) or support in follow up financing 
(mean= 4.065). 
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B. Results of structural equation model 
The resulting path model is shown in table 2. The degree of assessment and 
evaluating new ventures has no significant influence on the failure risk. The t-statistic is 
not significant on a 95 per cent level for this construct. Therefore, we rejected H1.  
Looking at contracting, we found no significance due to low t-statistics. Hence, 
we rejected H2.  
Governance is not significant considering the low t-statistics. Therefore, we 
rejected H3. 
Our results show a high impact of investment manager´s experience and skills 
on failure risk of VC-backed firms. This is indicated by the high factor loading as well 
as the high value of the t-statistics. The connotation of the loading is negative stating 
that a high experience leads to low risk. Thus, we accepted H4. 
Management support is highly significant. Therefore, we accept H5. However 
the sign is surprisingly positive. 
 
Table 2. Reliability measure of the PLS model 
Significance of * 90 % level, ** 95 % level, *** 99 % level 
 
Construct Loadings t-Statistics Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Composite 
reliability 
AVE f² q² 
Assessment 
and evaluation 
of new 
ventures 
0.157 1.559 1 1 1 0.030 0.012 
Contracting 0.194 1.239 1 1 1 0.039 0.006 
Investment 
Manager´s 
experience and 
skills 
-0.273 2.046** 0.682 0.806 0.511 0.088 0.014 
Governance 
mechanisms 
-0.224 1.300 0.705 0.818 0.604 0.037 0.012 
Management 
support 
0.451 3.219** 1 1 1 0.241 0.05 
Failure risk - - 0.715 0.823 0.540   
 
The control variables, age and industry, had no significant effect. We therefore 
removed them from the final model. 
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C. Results of inner models 
In the following, we looked at the indicator variables of the single constructs. 
The indicator loadings and t-statistics are shown in table 3. Looking at the construct 
assessment and evaluating ventures the only significant variable was expert assessment. 
IP protection, references for technology and references for founders are not significant. 
Analyzing the construct contracting only liquidation preference is significant. We 
omitted the items syndication partner, investment sum and shares of investors. All 
items except of business skills were relevant when we looked at the construct 
investment manager´s experience and skills. In the construct governance mechanisms 
all variables were significant.  
Looking at the construct business failure all variables were significant and had a 
high factor loading. The factor loading was above 0.6 for all our variables which is an 
acceptable value (Hair et al., 2013). This showed the validity of our approach to 
measure failure risk by using the four most important risks of bankruptcy. 
 
Table 3. Loadings and t-statistics of the items 
Significance of * 90 % level, ** 95 % level, *** 99 % level 
Item Loadings t-Statistics Item Loadings t-Statistics 
Assessment and 
evaluation of 
new ventures 
  Management 
support 
  
Evaluation 1 - Use of Contacts 1 - 
Contracting   Failure   
Liquidation 1 - HR risk 0.624 3.695** 
Investment 
Manager´s 
experience and 
skills 
  Liquidity risk 0.775 9.426** 
Working 
experience 
0.797 2.258** Market risk 0.701 5.126** 
Founding 
experience 
0.705 2.957** Technology risk 0.823 7.904** 
Network size 0.623 1.976**    
Technology 
expertise 
0.722 2.066**    
Governance 
mechanisms 
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Milestones 0.883 2.926**    
Information 
through 
network 
0.663 2.231**    
Reporting 0.770 2.828**    
 
D. Reliability measures 
We followed the framework of Hair et al. (2013) to assess the reliability of the 
PLS model. We therefore looked separately at the structural model and the 
measurement model. 
1. Reliability measures of structural model 
The R² of our model was 0.282 which is an acceptable value (Huber et al., 
2007; Nitzl, 2010). The Q² value was greater than zero and therefore indicates a 
predictive relevance of the model (Henseler et al., 2009). The effect size of the 
constructs contracting, investment manager´s experience and skills, governance and 
support were above 0.02 showing a weak effect. The effect size of the construct 
assessment and evaluation of new ventures was below 0.02. This is not surprising as the 
t-test is not significant and the factor loading is below 0.2. The predictive relevance for 
the construct investment manager´s experience and skills is weak stated by a value 
above 0.02. The value for predictive relevance for the constructs is below 0.02 
indicating a low predictive relevance. We choose to include the constructs in the model 
due to the explorative nature of the study. 
2. Reliability measures of inner model 
Indicators with a loading below 0.4 were stepwise removed so that only 
indicators with a standardized indicator loading above this value were included in the 
model. This is an acceptable approach according to Henseler et al. (2009) and Hair et 
at. (2013). All indicators are significant on a 95 per cent level determined by the t-
statics. The internal consistency reliability was measured by Cronbach’s alpha and 
composite reliability. The value for Cronbach’s alpha was above 0.6, which is 
permissible (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). The composite reliability was above 0.7 
for all the constructs (see table 2), which is an acceptable value (Henseler et al., 2009; 
Hair et al., 2013). The average variance accepted (AVE) was used to measure the 
convergent validity. This approach is widely accepted in literature (Fornell and Larcker, 
1981; Hair et al., 2013). All the measures were above 0.5 showing an excellent value. 
We used Fornell-Larcker criterion results, cross loadings and heterotrait-monotrait 
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ratio of correlations (HTMT) to test for discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 
1981; Ringle et al., 2015). The model passed all three tests as described in the appendix 
C. 
 
V. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Based on a structured literature review, the analysis of qualitative data of nine 
VC funds and an empirical analysis using a structural equation model we studied five 
groups of risk management measures VCCs can partake in their ventures to reduce 
failure risk. We empirically tested the relevance for each group of risk management 
measures. As a result, we show which risk management measures have an influence on 
business failure of VC-backed ventures. 
First, the assessment of the investment prior the decision had no significant 
influence to reduce the failure risk in VCC´s ventures in the model. Therefore, we 
cannot support the studies of Kut et al. (2007), Kut and Smolarski (2006), Lu et al. 
(2006), Smolarski et al. (2005) and Tourani-Rad and England (2003) showing the 
significant relevance of assessment and evaluation in the pre-investment phase. One 
reason might be that this is often seen as the most important part in the investment 
decision process. The usage of different assessment methods was high for all cases in the 
sample (see descriptive statistics in A1), which confirms Kut et al. (2007) that risk 
management in evaluating new investments is a well-developed area in practice in the 
VC industry. However, the difference between the usages within the ventures might 
not be very high resulting in no significant influence.  
Second, the construct contracting is not significant. Hence, we cannot support 
the results of Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011), Kut et al. (2007) and Tan et al. (2008) 
that financial contracting can be used by VCC as a protection against downside risk. A 
reason for that could be that VCC use similar formats of contracting, which also can be 
seen in the descriptive statistics (A1). In addition, all VCC used staged financing, 
syndication and milestone with each venture. This implies no significant differences 
across the cases in the sample. 
Third, the results show that governance mechanisms are not significant to 
reduce failure risk in the model. The descriptive statistics showed that governance 
mechanisms are extensively used in all ventures supporting no significance of the 
statistical results (see Appendix A). Considering this result, we cannot support 
Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) and Tan et al. (2008) who found significant evidence for 
the importance of governance mechanisms in VC risk management. 
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The construct investment manager´s experience and skills as a risk management 
measure in VC-backed ventures are significant, which was rarely discussed in literature 
before. This finding continuous the discussion of Hopp and Lukas (2014) who were 
among the first showing that investment managers have various competencies, skills 
and experiences which might be crucial for the success and failure ventures. Also, the 
study of Yazdipour and Constand (2010) highlighted the importance of human capital 
in failure prediction of private firms. If the investment manager is more experienced the 
VC-backed ventures have less failure risk as the investment manager might be able to 
uncover possible problematic issues earlier and use the right countermeasures. In 
addition, we found that also VC-backed ventures supported by investment managers 
with founding experience have a lesser risk of failure.  
Last, we found that management support is significant. Counter-intuitively, the 
connotation is negative. The extensive use of management support leads to a higher 
risk. This might be a chicken-and-egg problem. Possibly, investors only extensively 
support their portfolio companies when risk is already high which might be too late to 
save the company. To test this assumption we created a PLS model to analyze the 
influence of business failure on the degree of management support. We found that a 
high chance of business failure has a positive impact on the degree of management 
support as described by the use of VCC´s network and bringing external consultants 
into the portfolio company. Therefore, we can assume that this result might be 
explained by a chicken-egg problem. Considering this problem in the study, we 
recommend further investigation on the use of the risk management measures in the 
VC industry. It would be interesting to analyze if risk mitigation measures are only 
used when a risk occurred or also in a preemptive way. 
 
VI. Limitations and implications 
A. Limitations 
Like most empirical studies the research is subject to several limitations. First, 
we could not assess all risk management measures identified in literature. A holistic 
model including further risk management measures could lead to additional results.  
Secondly, we used a self-assessment of the investment manager for their 
experience in a survey. This might introduce a possible bias. However, the survey 
covered a variety of different areas of VC financing wherefore it was not clear for the 
investment managers that a connection between their experience and the risk was 
made.  
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Thirdly, we focused on German technology start-ups from public and private 
VC funds. It is unclear if the results can be generalized to other countries and all types 
of new ventures. Therefore, similar studies, e.g. using data in the US or Asia, might 
uncover similarities and differences between risk management measures across 
countries.  
The data set consists of a higher share of public as well as public private 
partnership funds which also could include a possible bias as public funds might pursue 
a different investment and risk management strategy as private funds.  
The quantitative approach does not allow to further study changes in the 
perceived failure risk over time. A qualitative approach to explicitly study the 
development of the risks in different investment stages could further yield to new 
results. 
In addition, the use of PLS does not allow to control for endogeneity effects 
which is also discussed in current literature (Ronko and Evermann, 2013; Henseler et 
al., 2014).  
The results might be partially biased due to the fact that our sample includes 
VC investments from 2005 - 2010, i.e. during the financial crisis. It might be possible 
that risks were higher during that time because of the economic downturn and the 
restricted capital situation. 
B. Implications 
Our research has several implications for the literature and practice.  
In terms of the literature, the analysis has shown that the research stream of risk 
management in VC investments is rather underdeveloped, but nevertheless of great 
practical importance, for VCCs. We tested the effectiveness of different risk 
management measures on lowering the risk of business failure in new ventures. 
Thereby, we showed the importance of risk management on the probability of failure. 
With this article we aim to encourage discussions on and analyses of this field of 
literature to shed more light on VCC risk management practices. The results indicate 
the relevance of the investment manager in risk management in VC investments. 
Continuing this discussion, a possible research question could be which experiences, 
skills and knowledge as well as what kind of interaction between founders lowers 
venture´s failure risk. Another research direction might be a cross-country analysis as 
there are several differences, e.g. legal, between European and US VCCs. The German 
law for asset management companies like VCC prohibits active involvement of the 
VCC in the portfolio firm. VCC are only allowed to provide advice which also impacts 
their risk management practices. Further one, a mixed method approach including, for 
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example, surveys, verbal protocol analysis, and content analysis might be favorable to 
explore aspects of formal and informal risk assessment in VC investments. 
Furthermore, since our sample is limited to early stage VC funds, further investigations 
into different fund stages might be of interest to explore the differences across 
investment stages.  
In terms of practice, we showed that all VCC in our sample pursue comparable 
risk management measures for the assessment and evaluation of new ventures, in 
contracting as well as in governance issues. Looking at the descriptive statistics we 
observed that particularly governance mechanisms, liquidation preferences and partially 
assessment and evaluation measures are extensively applied by VCC in their ventures in 
our data set. Nevertheless, there mechanisms do not show a significant influence on 
failure risk, which might be explained by the fact that they act like hygiene factors. Our 
study provides empirical evidence for the great importance of investment manager´s 
experience and skills which could be understand as the motivator of the analyzed risk 
management. Considering our empirical results, LPs and VC funds should therefore 
rely on highly experienced employees managing ventures. The results suggest that VCC 
have to invest in their human capital to improve the skills and knowledge of their 
investment managers as well as the working environment and conditions to hire the 
best investment managers. In that course, an exchange between more experienced and 
younger investment managers triggered by the VCC might be a possibility to achieve a 
knowledge transfer. 
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APPENDIX A:   
Table 4. Overview of academic work on risk management in VC-backed ventures from 2005-2015 
 
Reference Sample Data collection method Data analysis method 
Bamford and Douthett 
(2013) 
Initial public offerings 
(IPO)                                                                 
n = 545  
Investors Daily Digest 
and Barron´s
Descriptive statistics                                       
Logistic regression                                        
OLS estimation 
Bengtsson and Sensoy 
(2010) 
Private partnership VCs  
n = 646 
Start-up companies 
n = 1,266 
Investment rounds 
n = 1,534 
Private Consulting firm 
VCExperts 
Descriptive statistics 
Correlations 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
Probit regression 
OLS regression 
Heckman-Sorensen Index 
Cumming et al. (2005) Investment rounds 
n = 18,774 
VentureExpert Descriptive statistics  
Logit regression 
Poisson regression 
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Comparison of 
proportions and means 
tests 
Correlations 
Hopp (2010) Capital contributions            
n = 2,373 (961 ventures 
and 437 VCCs)       
Thomson Venture 
Economics 
Descriptive statistics 
Correlations 
Logistic regression 
Hopp and Lukas (2014) VC investments                                          
n= 2,373 in Germany 
Public sources and 
Thomson Venture 
Economics 
Descriptive statistics                               
Correlation matrix                               
Weibull duration model                               
Heckman type selection 
model     
Kut et al. (2007) Venture capital and buy-
out funds 
n = 142 
Survey  Descriptive statistics 
Mann-Whitney test 
Pearson chi-square test 
Kut et al. (2006) Venture capital and buy-
out funds 
n = 142 
Survey  Descriptive statistics 
Mann-Whitney test 
Pearson chi-square test 
Logit regression 
OLS regression 
Kut and Smolarski (2006) Private equity funds                                  
n = 33 from Germany and 
France                                                   
n = 21 from India 
Survey Descriptive statistics                                     
Mann Whitney test                                            
Pearson Chi-square test 
LiPuma and Park (2014) Invested rounds                                     
n = 962                                                         
VC-backed technology 
companies                                                         
n = 334  
InfoUSA´s CorpTech 
data
Descriptive statistics  
Pearson Correlations 
GLS regression 
Poisson regression 
Lu et al. (2006) VC firms                                                                  
n = 34 
Questionnaire survey                               
EDB and AVCJ 
Descriptive statistics                                    
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon                         
Correlations                                                    
Two-sided Pearson chi-
square                            
Hierarchical regression 
Maula et al. (2009) Technology-based firms                           
n = 91 
Venture Economics 
Database                 
Survey 
Descriptive statistics                             
Correlations                                                  
Standardized factor 
loadings                  
Goodness of fit statistics                  
Ning et al. (2015) Venture investments and 
deals 
n = 68  
Money Tree Report from 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers/ 
National Venture Capital 
Association using data 
from Thomson Reuters 
Descriptive statistics 
Correlations 
Multiple regression 
models 
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Payne et al. 
(2009) 
VC firms 
n = 26 
VC investors 
n = 52 
Survey  Descriptive statistics 
Varimax Rotated Factor 
Loadings  
Correlations 
GLS regression 
Multivariate regression 
Pbrimah O, Prakash P 
(2010) 
VC firms                                                         
n = 584 
Jay Ritter´s                                              
VentureXpert 
Descriptive statistics                                  
Tobit regression                                          
OLS regression                                                 
Variance-covariance 
matrix 
Smolarski et al. (2005) Private equity funds                           
n = 32 from UK            
n = 21 from India 
Survey Descriptive statistics 
Mann-Whitney test 
Pearson chi-square test 
Tan et al. (2008) VC firms 
n = 53 
Survey Descriptive statistics 
 
Wang et al. (2012) VC-backed companies                                   
n = 1,757 (772 reporting 
sales information)                                                      
Financing rounds                                         
n = 5,896 (1,757 VC-
backed companies) 
VentureXpert                                                
Alliances database 
Descriptive statistics                                     
Correlations                                                    
Regression analysis (OLS, 
negative binomal model) 
 
APPENDIX B:   
Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Std. 
Dev 
Scale Data Source 
Failure risk     
HR risk 3.200 1.317 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Liquidity risk 3.652 1.152 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Market risk 3.311 1.304 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Technology risk 2.711 1.455 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Assessment and evaluation     
Expert assessment 3.795 0.915 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
IP protection 3.435 1.424 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
References of technology 3.806 1.002 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
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managers 
References of founders 4.086 0.686 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Contracting     
Liquidation preference 4.096 0.990 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Number of syndication 
partners 
2.568 1.975 Metric Term sheet 
Investment sum 436,169 206,874 Metric (Euros) Investment committee papers 
Investment manager 
experience and skills 
    
Working experience 3.311 0.932 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Founding experience 3.237 0.993 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Technology expertise 3.355 0.842 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Business skills 3.946 0.578 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Network size 3.720 0.851 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Governance     
Milestones 4.247 0.789 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Information through network 4.323 0.710 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Reporting 4.355 0.653 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Shares of Founder 83.30 8.830 Per cent Term sheet 
Personal exchange 4.323 0.710 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Management support     
Support with competence 3.554 0.881 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Support with sales 2.681 0.987 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Support with technology 2.304 1.117 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Support with strategy 3.839 0.664 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Support with follow-up 
financing 
4.065 1.046 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
managers 
Use of network 3.785 0.900 Rating from 1 to 5 Survey with investment 
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managers 
Control     
Age 4.598 2.086 Metric Business Plan 
Industry – IT 0.385 0.473 Binary Investment committee papers 
Industry – Life Science 0.344 0.463 Binary Investment committee papers 
Industry – Material Science 0.098 0.177 Binary Investment committee papers 
Industry – Energy 0.057 0.108 Binary Investment committee papers 
Industry – 
Telecommunication 
0.041 0.079 Binary Investment committee papers 
Industry – Other 0.090 0.164 Binary Investment committee papers 
 
APPENDIX C:   
In table 6, the Fornell-Lacker criterion is shown. The table shows the latent 
variable correlation. In the diagonal the square root of the AVE can be found. This 
value should be higher than all values below and left in the table to pass the 
discriminant validity. This is the case for our model. 
Table 6. Fornell-Lacker Criterion 
 Failure risk Assessment 
and 
evaluation 
Contracting Investment 
manager 
experience 
and skills 
Governance Management 
support 
Failure risk 0.735      
Assessment 
and 
evaluation 
0.225 1.000     
Contracting 0.361 0.214 1.000    
Investment 
manager 
experience 
and skills 
-
0.183 
0.130 -0.158 0.715   
Governance 0.201 0.298 0.435 -0.050 0.777  
Management 
support 
0.383 0.304 -0.416 0.197 0.641 1.000 
 
In table 7, the cross loadings of each item in our PLS model are shown. Each 
variable should load highest on its corresponding construct. Then, the discriminant 
validity test is passed. This is the case in our model. 
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Table 7. Cross-Loadings 
 Failure risk Assessment 
and 
evaluation 
Contracting Investment 
manager 
experience 
and skills 
Governance Management 
support 
Failure risk       
HR risk 0.624 0.006 0.019 -0.199 -0.126 0.046 
Liquidity risk 0.775 0.105 0.338 -0.222 0.184 0.245 
Market risk 0.701 0.297 0.353 0.071 0.241 0.339 
Technology 
risk 
0.823 0.212 0.259 -0.202 0.187 0.380 
Assessment 
and 
evaluation 
      
Evaluation 0.234 1.000 0.214 0.130 0.298 0.304 
Contracting       
Liquidation 0.361 0.214 1.000 -0.158 0.435 0.416 
Investment 
manager 
experience 
and skills 
      
Working 
experience 
-0.137 0.177 -0.080 0.797 0.127 0.290 
Founding 
experience 
-0.159 0.078 -0.256 0.705 -0.292 -0.174 
Network size -0.110 -0.018 0.007 0.623 0.096 0.291 
Technology 
expertise 
-0.106 0.123 -0.068 0.722 -0.001 0.261 
Governance       
Milestones 0.227 0.161 0.414 -0.056 0.883 0.476 
Information 
through 
network 
0.098 0.349 0.181 0.015 0.663 0.577 
Reporting 0.114 0.304 0.366 -0.055 0.770 0.541 
Management 
support 
      
Use of 
network 
0.383 0.304 0.416 0.197 0.641 1.000 
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In table 8, the heterortrait-monotrait ratio of correlations (HTMT) is shown. If 
the HTMT is below 0.900 discriminant validity has been established between two 
constructs. This is the case for all of our items. 
Table 8. Heterortrait-Monotrait Ratio Criterion 
 Failure risk Assessment 
and 
evaluation 
Contracting Investment 
manager 
experience 
and skills 
Governance Management 
support 
Failure risk       
Assessment 
and 
evaluation 
0.249      
Contracting 0.390 0.214     
Investment 
manager 
experience 
and skills 
0.332 0.168 0.174    
Governance 0.342 0.407 0.481 0.271   
Management 
support 
0.407 0.304 0.416 0.430 0.797  
 
